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Abstract—Today’s large-scale computations, e.g., in
the cloud, are subject to a multitude of risks con-
cerning the divulging and ownership of private data.
Privacy risks are mainly addressed using encryption-
based techniques. These make data private, but costly
to operate. Furthermore, today’s computations have to
ensure privacy properties in the context of complex
software compositions; however, no general support
for the declarative definition and implementation of
privacy-preserving applications has been put forward.
This article presents an approach to the correct com-
position of privacy-preserving applications in the cloud.
Our approach provides language support for the compo-
sition of encryption- and fragmentation-based privacy-
preserving algorithms. This language comes with a set
of laws that allows us to verify privacy properties.
Finally, we introduce implementation support in Scala
that ensures privacy properties by construction using




The generalization of large-scale service-based computa-
tions executed over mutualized resources, notably in the
context of cloud computing, has considerably increased the
risk of losing control or even ownership of one’s personal
data. In particular, the confidentiality and integrity of
private data are at risk. Currently, privacy-preserving com-
putations use frequently encryption techniques in order to
preserve such properties of private data. However, these
techniques have important drawbacks. They are costly to
apply. They result in large amount of data being kept in
one place (that are a target for attacks). And they do not
allow to flexibly handle subsets of encrypted data.
In order to improve on these characteristics, alternative
approaches have been explored. Data fragmentation [1],
[2], in particular, consists in dividing data sets into parts
and store them in different places. No unauthorized party
can thus extract sensitive information from the pieces.
Fragmentation allows to eliminate (most of) the compu-
tational overhead incurred by en/decryption. It allows
for the distribution of data on a multitude of sites and
supports the handling of subsets of data sets. Because
fragmentation-based approaches frequently use encryption
for parts of the data and computations, handling privacy
properties results in complex compositions of privacy tech-
niques. However, no comprehensive composition approach
for the construction of privacy-preserving computations
has been put forward until now.
Figure 1 shows the need for such a comprehensive
composition approach for the construction of privacy-
preserving computations. Figure 1a illustrates a privacy-
preserving query (of the number, per day, of meetings
Alice had in her office last week) on a local application.
The query is easy to formulate because Alice’s data is
stored locally and is not subject to privacy problems.
However, the same computation in the context of cloud
computing requires to encrypt the database. Then, Alice
has to decrypt the database on her computer to perform
the query and encrypt the result once again, which is
obviously not efficient. Illustration 1b shows how the
composition of fragmentation with encryption and client-
side computation can improve the query efficiency while
preserving privacy. In Particular, the composition of these
three techniques makes the query operates without any
decryption overhead. However, the formulation of queries
is far more difficult and error-prone in this case.
Currently, compositions of privacy-preserving strate-
gies are programmed using traditional programming means
(languages or frameworks) that do not provide any correct-
ness guarantees. This article makes the following contribu-
tions, in this context:
• A motivation for the need of dedicated means for
the correct composition of different privacy-preserving
strategies, in particular, strategies based on encryption,
fragmentation and client side computation. (Sec. II)
• A language for the declarative definition of a range of
(composed) strategies for the enforcement of privacy-
centric properties. The language is a SQL-like query
language extended with abstractions for fragmentation
and encryption. The language comes equipped with
a set of laws that ensure the correct composition of
privacy strategies and enables the transformation of
a privacy-preserving query over a local application to
a privacy-preserving query over a cloud application.
(Sec. III)
• An implementation of the language in Scala that har-
nesses advanced typing properties in order to enforce
the correct composition of privacy strategies. Specifi-
cally, the implementation prevents the compilation if
the composition is not correct. (Sec. IV)
In addition, the paper discusses related work (Sec. V) and








  FROM AgendaDB
  WHERE today-date<8
  AND address = 'desk'













  FROM Frag2






  FROM Frag1
  WHERE today-date<8




Fig. 1: Privacy-Preserving Agenda as Local (a) and cloud (b) Application
II. Motivation
Consider an application developed for the cloud in order
to improve, for instance, its availability, data replication
properties or integration with other applications. Typi-
cally, the basic workflow consists in first the outsourcing
of user data to a database service, and then applying
applications hosted in the cloud to that data. For the case
of the agenda application, one has first to subscribe to a
cloud database service and outsource meeting data, and
then install the agenda application on a cloud platform.
The privacy concern. In the age of cloud computing, cloud
application programmers outsource without considering
the personal data of individuals. Outsourcing reveals per-
sonal data to cloud providers that can share information
with third parties. This is the conundrum of cloud com-
puting: how to share data and keep personal data private.
To handle the privacy concern, two types of approaches
have been introduced. The first approach focuses on super-
vised cloud. It includes systems relying on access control
and policy enforcement [3], [4] to support accountability
for violations [5]. The second approach focuses on an
unsupervised cloud. It is a set of techniques to keep data
private, such as encryption [6], fragmentation [2], differ-
ential privacy [7] and client-side computation [8]. Each
technique has good privacy properties but, in general, do
not offer as many guarantees as policy enforcement. For
instance, data encryption fits for storage protection but
not for computations and differential privacy is useful for
statistical databases only. The main advantage is that they
are applicable to real world problems.
This article handles the privacy concern in unsuper-
vised clouds. We show that even if each technique taken by
itself is limited, the composition of such techniques is much
more effective and enables the development of expressive
privacy-preserving cloud applications. In the remainder
of this article, we will focus on the composition of three
classes of techniques: encryption, fragmentation and client-
side computations.
A. Encryption, Fragmentation and Client-Side Computa-
tions
Encryption. Encryption [6] is the process of encoding
information before it is outsourced in such a way that only
authorized parties can read it.
Historically, encryption is the first approach to the
protection of private databases in the cloud. Using, for
instance, a symmetric encryption algorithm, a client en-
crypts its data before outsourcing it in the cloud. All
queries can then simply be executed by first returning
the necessary data from the database to the client in its
encrypted state, be decrypted by her, and execute the
query on her side. This approach is, however, far too
expensive to be practical, since Alice has to brings back
a large amount of data. One solution to this problem are
recent encryption schemes, so called homomorphic ones,
that execute query directly on encrypted data.
Theoretically, fully homomorphic schemes enable ar-
bitrary operations to be performed on encrypted data.
However, these schemes are prohibitively expensive to
compute. Reasonably efficient homomorphic schemes are
currently known only for a small set of operations. A de-
terministic encryption scheme [9], e.g., allows to efficiently
check the equality of values by comparing encrypted data.
For this reason, query execution over encrypted data is
often seen as practical only if corresponding efficient ho-
momorphic encryption schemes are available [10].
Fragmentation. (Vertical) fragmentation [1], [2] is the pro-
cess of separating information into non-linkable fragments
in such a way that only authorized parties can recompose
the original information. Fragmentation is applicable when
associations of data are sensitive rather than individual
data items themselves.
Fragmentation is tightly coupled to the notion of pri-
vacy constraints. A privacy constraint specifies which data
are sensitive and should, therefore, be kept confidential.
In our agenda application, for instance, meetings should
satisfy two privacy constraints. An agenda meeting is the
triplet (date, name, address) that represents the meeting
date, the name of the contact and the meeting location.
The first constraint is {date, address} so that an attacker
cannot locate Alice by associating an address to a meet-
ing date. The second constraint should be {name} so
that an attacker cannot infer the name of Alice’s con-
tacts. Here, fragmentation aims to make privacy associ-
ations such as {date, address} safe by splitting the triplet
(date, name, address) in two.
Client-side computation. Client-side computation [8] des-
ignates the concept of letting clients perform sensitive
computations on their computer and upload only the
results. Especially, client-side computation stores private
information on the client side. Thus, computations on
private data are performed on the client side. Services
that require strong guarantees on the truthfulness of the
result, such as billing service, can use, e.g., zero-knowledge
protocols [8] to ensure the integrity of the query results and
privacy.
B. Composition of Privacy-Enforcement Techniques
The application. Figure 1b shows a common case in which
a composition of techniques is required to obtain efficient
and private application in the cloud. The application is
the cloud version of the local one (Fig. 1a) and requires a
composition of encryption, fragmentation and client-side
computation.
To distribute this agenda application in a privacy-
preserving manner, the programmer adopts the two pri-
vacy constraints {date, address} and {name} introduced
in Sec. II-A. A programmer then has to choose a con-
figuration for the application that satisfies the privacy
constraints. First, she may, for instance, fragment the
database in two. The first fragment contains the dates.
The second contains the names and addresses. Now, the
{date, address} constraint is safe unless the two fragments
are joined. Then, the programmer encrypts names with
an homomorphic encryption that supports equality, thus
ensuring that the {name} constraint is satisfied.
Based on such a configuration, the query that computes
the number of meetings Alice had per day at her desk
last week (1 in Fig. 1b) is distributed on both fragments.
It applies selection and grouping operations on the first
fragment (21) to obtain the dates and identifiers of the
meetings of the past week. At the same time, it applies
the selection on the second fragment (22) to get identifiers
of the office meetings. The application then fully takes
advantages of the cloud, whether for storage or querying.
However, the agenda has to join results of both fragments
to count the number of people. Because that operation
is not privacy preserving, finally, the rest of the query is
executed on Alice’s side (3),(4).
Another useful query built on top of cloud configuration
is the number of people Alice has met last week (Fig. 2).
The query uses a left-first strategy of fragmentation to be
efficient. It applies the selection on the left fragment to
get identifiers of meetings the past week (2), (3). It then
applies projection and grouping operations to the right
fragment, and the programmer uses identifiers obtained
from the left fragment to reduce the number of compo-
nents (4). The grouping operation requires to compare
names, but this is fine since names are encrypted with an
homomorphic scheme that supports equality testing. More-
over, the overhead due to encryption is minimal because









  FROM FragRight
  WHERE id in ids






  FROM FragLeft
  WHERE today-date<8
Fig. 2: Number of people Alice met last week
C. Language-Support to the Rescue
The above examples, as well as the large majority of real
cloud applications, require several privacy techniques to
be composed. In this case, the formulation of queries is far
more difficult and errors easily slip in. For instance, the
request in Fig. 2 is safe regarding privacy solely because
of step (2) that drops the dates from the result. If step
(2) does not drop dates, then the agenda application can
join dates with addresses and violate the {date, address}
privacy constraint. Even without considering a specific
request, composition makes it easy to write non-sense
programs. For example, trying to encrypt twice the same
column in a database does not make sense. Similarly,
trying to sum values encrypted with a symmetric scheme
is not reasonable.
To help programmers compose privacy techniques, we
propose a functional language that focuses on privacy
protection and query computation. As input, we have
a privacy relation and apply privacy/query functions in
turn to reduce the number of components in the relation.
Together with the language, a set of algebraic laws specifies
how to transform a local program to a privacy-preserving
distributed cloud application.
We are convinced that this formalization constitutes
an appropriate abstraction to help programmers reason
on query and privacy techniques composition. The corre-
sponding language-level and implementation support the
declarative definition of privacy-preserving cloud applica-
tions and their efficient execution.
III. Language-based composition of
privacy-enforcement techniques
This section formally describes our language for composi-
tion of encryption, fragmentation and client side compu-
tation techniques. First, we introduce its commands based
on a SQL-like query language extended with abstractions
for fragmentation and encryption. Second, we show how
a query can be transformed by introducing privacy com-
mands. Finally, we formalize and generalize our approach
by providing composition laws.
A. Language Description
Our language is based on database queries obeying
relational algebra properties.
A relation (i.e., a table) is a set of tuples. For
instance, an agenda stores a meeting as a triple
(date, name, address) representing the meeting date, the
name of the contact and the meeting location. Our lan-
guage offers four query functions:
• A selection σ filters tuples of a relation. For in-
stance σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk) keeps meetings
whose date is at most a week old and has desk as
meeting venue.
• A projection pi keeps a subset of the columns of a
relation. For instance pidate keeps only the date of
meetings.
• A grouping group definition groups together tuples of
a relation. For instance, groupdate creates a group of
tuples for each date.
• An aggregation fold computes a single value for groups.
For instance, count = fold (+1) 0 counts the number of
meeting in a group.
Note that we omit a product operation of tables be-
cause it is not required by our examples but it could be
easily introduced. These functions can be composed (◦) in
order to define complex queries according to the following
grammar:
Q ::= Q ◦Q | σ | pi | group | fold f k
Note that a sequence of function compositions is read from
right to left. For instance, the number of meetings per day
at desk last week is:
count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
Our language also provides privacy-related pairs of
functions:
• crypts,as/decrypts,as encrypts/decrypts with a scheme
s the components of tuples corresponding to pias. For
instance, cryptheq,name encrypts the contacts in the
agenda, although they still can be compared because
heq is an homomorphic encryption that supports equal-
ity.
• fragpias/defragpias vertically fragments/defragments a
table of tuples into two tables of tuples, so that the
tuples of the first table contain only the components
corresponding to pias and the tuples of the second table
contain the remaining components (noted pia¯s). For
instance, fragpidate fragments the agenda table into a
first table for the dates and a second table for the
names and addresses. Note [1] that in both tables each
tuple also contains an index in order to reconstruct the
original tuples.
• fragσp/defragσp horizontally fragments/defragments
a table of tuples into two tables. For instance,
fragσtoday−date<8 fragments the agenda into two tables
of meetings. The first table contains only the meetings
of last week and the second table contains the older
meetings.
These privacy functions can be composed to make
queries privacy-aware as defined by the following grammar:
Qp ::= Qp ◦Qp | Q | crypt | decrypt | frag | defrag
For instance, when the agenda is fragmented (date on
one host, name and address on another host) and the
identity of contacts is encrypted, the query for the number
of meetings per day at desk last week is:
count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σtoday−date<8, σaddress=desk)
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
It can be read as: encrypt the contacts’ names, then
fragment the table, select the meeting dates of last week
on the first fragment and group them, select the meeting
with desk as venue on the second fragment, defragment
the results in order to get a group by day but only for
the desk venue, and finally count the number in groups.
Note that there is no need to call the decrypt function here
because count does not require values, but count must be
executed on the client side because defrag discards privacy
protection. The next section shows how to transform the
local query into the private one.
B. Making a Query Private with Transformations
The local query that computes the number of meeting
per day at desk last week is:
Q1 ≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
It can be decentralized by introducing fragmentation
and encryption. In the following, the transformation de-
lays the discarding of privacy protection (i.e., “push”
defrag/decrypt to the left in a query); intuitively, this
means that more computations are performed in the cloud
rather than on the client side:
Q1 ≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
◦ defragpidate ◦ fragpidate
we add frag then defrag at the beginning (i.e., right) of
the query (this is correct since these functions are inverse)
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
◦ defragpidate ◦ fragpidate
◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
similarly we introduce encryption
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ defragpidate
◦ (σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt and defrag must be executed at the owner’s place
since they discard protection, so we delay them to the left.
defrag commutes with σ, but the selection must be applied
only to the relevant fragment
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ defragpidate
◦ (pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), pidate ◦ σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
defrag and pi commutes, but the projection must be applied
to each fragment
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ defragpidate
◦ (pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
the projection on components missing in the fragment can
be simplified
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
defrag and group commutes, but grouping must be
performed only in the relevant fragment
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8),
σ(address=desk) ◦ decryptheq,name)
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt commutes with frag, must be applied to both
fragments and it can be simplified when components are
Identity Laws:
id ≡ decrypts,as ◦ crypts,as (1)
id ≡ defragpias ◦ fragpias (2)
id ≡ defragσp ◦ fragσp (3)
Projection Laws:
pia ◦ decrypts,a ≡ decrypts,a ◦ pia (4)
piaa¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (pia, pia¯) (5)
pia ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (pia, pia) (6)
pia¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (pia¯, pia¯) (7)
pia ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (pia, pia) (8)
Grouping Laws:
groupa ◦ decrypts,b ≡ decrypts,b ◦ groupa if a /∈P(b) (9)
groupa ◦ decrypts,b ≡ decrypts,b ◦ groupsa if a ∈P(b) (10)
groupa ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (groupa, id) (11)
groupa¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (id, groupa¯) (12)
groupa ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (groupa, groupa) (13)
Selection Laws:
σp ◦ decrypts,a ≡ decrypts,a ◦ σp if dom(p) /∈P(a) (14)
σp ◦ decrypts,a ≡ decrypts,a ◦ σsp if dom(p) ∈P(a) (15)
σpa∧pa¯∧paa¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ σpaa¯ ◦ defragpia ◦ (σpa, σpa¯) (16)
σpa∧t∧t ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (σpa, id) (17)
σt∧pa¯∧t ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (id, σpa¯) (18)
σp′ ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (σp′ , σp′ ) (19)
Aggregating Laws:
count ◦ decrypts,as ≡ count (20)
Protection Composition Laws:
f ◦ id ≡ id ◦ f ≡ f (21)
(f1, f2) ◦ (g1, g2) ≡ (f1 ◦ f2, g1 ◦ g2) (22)
fragpia ◦ decrypts,a ≡ (decrypts,a, id) ◦ fragpia (23)
fragpia ◦ decrypts,a¯ ≡ (id, decrypts,a¯) ◦ fragpia (24)
decrypts,a ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (decrypts,a, id) (25)
decrypts,a¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (id, decrypts,a¯) (26)
fragσp ◦ decrypts,a ≡ (decrypts,a, decrypts,a) ◦ fragσp (27)
decrypts,a ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (decrypts,a, decrypts,a) (28)
Fig. 3: Some Laws of the Algebra of Fragmentation and Encryption
missing in the fragment
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8),
decryptheq,name ◦ σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt commutes with σ, the predicate of σ does not work
on encrypted data, thus it does not require homomorphic
encryption to compute selection
≡ count ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt commutes with defrag
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
finally count computes the number of groups but it does
not rely on the value of tuples, so they do not require to
be decrypted 
C. Laws for Composition
We now generalize our transformational approach to
formally-defined composition laws following Backus’s ap-
proach [11] and thus get an axiomatic semantics. Our
langage obeys the laws detailed in Figure 3. They specify
how protection and query functions interact, in particular
how they commute. We review them briefly.
Identity Laws specify that pairs of protection functions
are inverse to each other. Applying a protection then
discarding a protection results in no protection. When
oriented from left to right, these three rules can be used
to introduce privacy functions in a query.
All the other rules specify when privacy protection
discarding and query functions commute. They can be
used to delay the discarding of protection and preform
computations in the cloud rather than on the client side.
The Projection Laws, (4) specifies that projection and
decrypt commute. When fragmentation is used, laws (5)-
(8) specify a projection becomes a pair of projections (one
per fragment).
Grouping Laws (9),(10) specify that decrypt and group
commute. When groups are based on encrypted com-
ponents, group must take into account encryption (10).
Vertical fragmentation and group commute, when groups
can be computed in a single fragment (11),(12). Horizontal
fragmentation and group commute and groups must be
computed in both fragments (13).
Selection Laws are quite similar to Grouping Laws, but
the different cases are based on predicate parts dealing
with one fragment, the other or both. In particular, (16)
requires to select tuples in both vertical fragments after the
defragmentation (i.e., at owner’s place). In law (20), count
does not access values so that decrypt can be discarded.
Finally, Protection Composition Laws commute and
distribute functions in order to apply previous laws.
IV. Implementation
The functional language for the composition of privacy-
aware query-based applications introduced above permits
the definition of privacy-preserving cloud applications.
This section presents our Scala-based [12], [13] frame-
work1, a prototype that makes it possible to program
sophisticated privacy-aware cloud applications. It can be
viewed as an operational semantics of our language. In par-
ticular, our implementation harnesses Scala’s type system
to prevent the compilation of a program if the composition
of privacy techniques is not correct. This is achieved
1The sources of our framework and examples are available on the
Github platform at https://github.com/rcherrueau/phant
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 q <- query (db => {
4 val r1 = σ (db) (lastweek ∧ atdesk)
5 val r2 = pi (r1) (date)
6 val r3 = group (r2) (date)
7 val r4 = count (r3); r4
8 })
9 } yield q
(a) Local Application
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 _ <- fragV (_1) (Site1(_), Site2(_))
5 qL <- queryL (fragL => {
6 val r1 = σ (fragL) (σlift lastweek)
7 val r2 = pi (r1) (pilift date)
8 val r3 = group (r2) (date); r3
9 })
10 qR <- queryR (fragR => {
11 val r1 = σ (fragR) (σlift atdesk)
12 val r2 = pi (r1) (id); r2
13 })
14 } yield count (gather (qL, qR))
(b) Cloud Application
Fig. 4: Privacy-Preserving Agenda as Local (a) and Cloud (b) Application
through the satisfaction of the laws introduced previously.
We rely on property-based testing with ScalaCheck 2 to
argue their correctness.
A. From Theory to Practice
One of the main differences between the language and
the actual implementation is that we distinguish functions
that compute queries from functions that change the shape
of the database. In the previous section, the language uses
the pointwise application of one function to the result of
another, which successively reduces the database until the
result is obtained. This abstraction helps reasoning about
the query design. But, for real world programming we do
not want to reduce our database and lose components.
In practice, two different levels of computation are more
useful: one that uses database components to compute
queries, and another one that modifies the database shape
and applies privacy protection.
The programs in Fig. 4 query the number of meetings
per day at the desk last week, for a local (a) and a cloud
(b) application. The local application only uses functions
to query the database (σ, pi, group and count). In contrast,
the cloud application also composes functions for privacy
protection (crypt and fragV).
The Guardian Monad. In functional programming (FP),
functions with side effects such as protection functions are
performed in a monad [14], a pattern that makes it easy
to chain function calls. In particular, FP deals with side
effects using a state monad [15] that attaches state infor-
mation to function calls. For this reason, our framework
provides a state monad suitable for our purposes. Our
state monad, called guardian, has a progressive state, and
is defined based on the following requirements:
• The state is the database.
• Query functions only access the components of the
database. The application of a query function returns
some result that can be used as input for a second
query, without modifying the database. For instance,
the selection in figure 4a accesses the content of the
database and returns the result in r1 (line 4). Values in
r1 are then used for the projection (l.5) and so on, until
2http://scalacheck.org/
the count operation (l.7). At the end of the program
(l.9), the q variable gets the result of the query. But,
the database is unchanged from the input.
• Protection functions only modify the shape of a
database. For instance, the crypt instruction in fig-
ure 4b modifies the database by encrypting the second
column with a homomorphic scheme that supports
equality testing (l.3). Similarly, the fragV instruction
splits the database vertically on the first column (l.4).
It distributes the left fragment on site number one and
the right fragment on site number two. Henceforth, the
querying should be done on both fragments (l.5-13).
The protection functions crypt and fragV are comple-
mented by discarding functions decrypt and defragV. The
discarding functions from the framework differ from the
ones in the language because the framework ones discard
protection on the database, whereas the functions of the
language discard protections on the query result. In the
language example of the cloud application (Sec. III-B),
the call of defragpidate joins at the client side the result
of both fragments and hands it over to the count com-
putation. In the corresponding implementation (Fig. 4b),
calling a defragV will join fragments but not the result of
the queries. For this reason, the framework provides the
gather instruction, which is applied at the query level. It
brings back data at the client side and discards protection.
Given this, the program 4b gathers the result from both
fragments in order to count the number of meetings (l.14).
Note that in this example like in the example of the
language, the gather does not have to decrypt names
because the right query drops them.
Monads and types. In example 4b it does not make sense
to encrypt the second column twice; encrypting once is
enough. Likewise, it does not make sense to query the
fragmented/encrypted database in the same manner as the
local database; the new query request should be split and
work on encrypted data. Furthermore, it does not make
sense to group on encrypted data that do not support
equality testing; grouping on encrypted data requires the
use of an homomorphic scheme. To put it simply, compos-
ing privacy techniques can easily lead to runtime errors!
A main feature of monads is the use of types to exhibit
what it means to execute chained function applications.
Given this, the guardian monad exhibits useful information
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 // ill-typed , encryption of
5 // all-ready encrypted column:
6 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
7 // . . .
8 } yield ()
Fig. 5: Twice encryption does not type check
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 _ <- fragV (_1) (Site1(_), Site2(_))
5 // ill-typed , query on a non-local
6 // database.
7 q <- query (db => { /* ... */ })
8 // ...
9 } yield ()
Fig. 6: Fragmentation requires querying on fragments
at the type level to help the programmer write programs
that are well compose. For instance, the type of the
guardian at the end of program 4b is:
1 Guard[
2 Site0[DB[Raw[Date] |: Raw[Name] |: Raw[Addr]]],
3 (Site1[DB[Raw[Date] |: Id]],
4 Site2[DB[HEq[Name] |: Raw[Addr] |: Id]]),
5 Site0[List[Int]]]
with:
l.2 The shape of the database at the start of the computa-
tion. Here the guardian only accepts, as input, database
that stores date, name and address components (i.e.,
DB[Date |: Name |: Addr]) in plain form (i.e., Raw).
Components are uploaded at client side (i.e., Site0).
l.3-4 The shape of the database at the end of the compu-
tation. Here the guardian transforms the database into
two fragments. The first one stores dates in plain form
at site one. The second one stores names and addresses
at site two. The guardian also encrypts names with an
encryption that supports equality (i.e., HEq).
l.5 The type of the query result. Here, the type of the
number of meetings per day at the desk last week
(i.e., List[Int]). The Site0 annotation informs the
programmer that a part of the query is computed at
the client side.
The guardian monad gives useful type information and
uses this type information to check, during the compi-
lation of the program, that the composition of privacy
technique goes well. In other cases, the program does
not compile and does not produce an executable. Hence,
trying to encrypt an already encrypted column does not
compile (Fig. 5). Querying a fragment with a local ap-
proach does not compile (Fig. 6). Grouping/Filtering on
encrypted data that do not support the equality test does
not compile (Fig. 7). Generally speaking, the implementa-
tion satisfies the laws of figure 3. We rely on property-based
testing with ScalaCheck to argue their correctness.
Finally, monad bindings enable the naming of query
result such as in program 4b. Value qL contains the result
of the left query. Value qR contains the result of the
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 // Symmetric encryption of Name.
4 // Symmetric doesn’t support equatlity
5 // testing.
6 _ <- crypt (_2) (Symmetric(_))
7 q <- query (db => {
8 // ill-typed , name doesn’t
9 // support equality testing
10 group (db) (name)
11 })
12 // ...
13 } yield ()
Fig. 7: Grouping with encryption requires support equality
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 _ <- fragV (_1) (Site1(_), Site2(_))
5 // Queries on left fragment to get identifiers
6 // of meetings the past week:
7 ids <- queryL (fragL => {
8 val r1 =
9 σ (fragL) (σlift lastweek)
10 val r2 = pi (r1) (id); r2
11 })
12 q <- queryR (fragR => {
13 // Reduces the number of
14 // elems with ids of left
15 val r1 = σ (fragR) {
16 case (_,_,id) =>
17 ids.exists(id)
18 }
19 val r2 = group (r1) (name)
20 val r3 = count (r2); r3
21 })
22 } yield q
Fig. 8: Number of people met last week – left-first strategy
right query. Naming is essential when the programmer
wants to implement a profitable strategy like the left-
first strategy seen in the motivation section (figure 2).
Program 8 implements the left-first strategy. It simply
consists of naming the result of the left fragment, and then
use it in the right fragment.
B. Feedback on the Implementation with Scala
The Scala programming language is good for gener-
alization. We harness an advanced use of Scala implicits
and type members to perform type-level computations [16].
This enables the definition of arity-polymorphic databases,
so that the guardian monad can be implemented once and
for all. Without an arity-polymorphic database we would
have to write as many guardian monads as a database
could contain attributes, just like for tuples. In the pre-
vious examples (e.g., Fig. 4b), the presence of integers
prefixed by an underscore is the direct consequences of
type-level computation. Integers with an underscore are
Church encodings of the natural numbers at the type
level. They make it possible to identify, at compile time,
which column has to be encrypted, and the type of both
fragments after fragmentation.
Scala unifies functional and object-oriented program-
ming. Under the hood, data are objects and operations
method calls. This object model is good for modularity
and generalization, for instance, with subtyping. However,
it makes type inference less powerful than that of ML-
like functional languages that use the Hindley-Milner al-
gorithm. Because of that, the guardian monad sometimes
requires the programmer to explicitly specifying the type
to help the compiler infer type parameters. The code exam-
ples we presented above are a beautified version, omitting
a few type annotations that are needed by the compiler,
so that readers can more easily understand the intention
of the guardian monad. The code with all necessary type
annotation is available on the Github platform.
Finally, the guardian monad is a prototype which
proves the validity of our approach. In the future we intend
to bind the current implementation with popular Scala
libraries such as Akka3 for the distribution and Slick3 for
the mapping with real relational databases.
V. Related Work
In the following, we compare our work to three sets of
related work: approaches that focus on data fragmentation
and encryption, related work providing language support
for privacy properties and approaches, such as sticky
policies and security-aware objects that enable privacy
properties to be expressed and enforced directly.
Data fragmentation is a recent technique that strives
to ensure strong confidentiality properties without the
query overhead of encryption-based approaches. A recent
overview [2] presents a wide range of fragmentation tech-
niques and corresponding algorithms. However, none of
the discussed approaches include, unlike ours, declarative
means for the construction of fragmentation algorithms,
their composition especially with encapsulation techniques
and formal property guarantees over implementations.
Several language-based approaches have been proposed
for other privacy properties. Tetali et al. [17], have
proposed analysis techniques for compositions of different
types of homomorphic encryption algorithms. Fournet et
al. [8] define ZQL, a query language operating over
annotated database schemas that use strong typing in
order to ensure security properties of generated imple-
mentations in F# and C++. Reed and Pierce [7] propose
a specialized type system to enforce privacy guarantees
by means of differential privacy. However, none of these
approaches provide language support for the composition
of fragmentation and encapsulation techniques.
Another domain of related work consists in support
for the expression of privacy properties in the form of
policies and constraints over accesses to runtime objects.
Sticky policies [18], represent a class of policies that enable
the abstract definition of privacy properties and their
enforcement through runtime annotations. Self-protecting
software systems [19], such as self-defending objects [20],
support the protection of privacy properties of runtime
entities by strong encapsulation and access control of
these entities. Again however, none of these approaches, as
well as other policy-based and encapsulation-based privacy
techniques, support properties involving the composition
of fragmentation and encapsulation techniques.
3http://akka.io/; http://slick.typesafe.com/
VI. Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of how to define and
enforce privacy properties in the context of unsupervised
cloud with different privacy-enforcing techniques. We have
considered privacy properties that are formulated in terms
of compositions of data fragmentation, encryption and
client-side computation. We have provided programming
language support for the definition of such composed
privacy-enforcement strategies and an implementation on
top of the Scala language that, using a specialized type
system, ensures privacy properties by construction. We
have also provided a set of laws that ensures privacy prop-
erties and that are satisfied by the language mechanisms
we provide. As future work we intend to extend the set of
fragmentation techniques and approaches to encryption in
order to obtain a full-fledged composition theory for these
two classes of privacy-enforcing techniques.
References
[1] G. Aggarwal, M. Bawa, P. Ganesan et al., “Two can keep A
secret: A distributed architecture for secure database services,”
in CIDR, 2005.
[2] S. D. C. di Vimercati, R. F. Erbacher, S. Foresti et al., “Encryp-
tion and fragmentation for data confidentiality in the cloud,”
in FOSAD, 2013.
[3] S. Pearson and M. C. Mont, “Sticky policies: An approach for
managing privacy across multiple parties,” IEEE Computer,
vol. 44, no. 9, 2011.
[4] Y.-Y. Chen, P. A. Jamkhedkar, and R. B. Lee, “A software-
hardware architecture for self-protecting data,” in CCS, 2012.
[5] D. J. Weitzner, H. Abelson, T. Berners-Lee et al., “Information
accountability,” Communication of the ACM, 2008.
[6] D. Salomon, Data privacy and security: encryption and infor-
mation hiding. Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.
[7] J. Reed and B. C. Pierce, “Distance makes the types grow
stronger: a calculus for differential privacy,” in ICFP, 2010.
[8] C. Fournet, M. Kohlweiss et al., “ZQL: A compiler for privacy-
preserving data processing,” in USENIX Security, 2013.
[9] B. Schneier, Applied cryptography - protocols, algorithms, and
source code in C (2. ed.). Wiley, 1996.
[10] M. Naehrig, K. Lauter, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Can homo-
morphic encryption be practical?” in CCSW, 2011.
[11] J. W. Backus, “Can Programming Be Liberated From the
von Neumann Style? A Functional Style and its Algebra of
Programs,” Commun. ACM, vol. 21, no. 8, 1978.
[12] M. Odersky, L. Spoon, and B. Venners, Programming in Scala.
Artima Inc, 2008.
[13] P. Chiusano and R. Bjarnason, Functional Programming in
Scala. Manning Publications Co., 2014.
[14] P. Wadler, “Comprehending monads,” Mathematical Structures
in Computer Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 1992.
[15] ——, “The essence of functional programming,” in Principles
of Programming Languages, 1992.
[16] B. C. d. S. Oliveira, A. Moors, and M. Odersky, “Type classes
as objects and implicits,” in OOPSLA, 2010.
[17] S. D. Tetalli, M. Lesani, R. Majumdar et al., “MrCrypt: static
analysis for secure cloud computations,” in OOPSLA, 2013.
[18] G. Karjoth, M. Schunter, and M. Waidner, “Platform for
enterprise privacy practices: Privacy-enabled management of
customer data,” in Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2002.
[19] E. Yuan, N. Esfahani, and S. Malek, “A systematic survey of
self-protecting software systems,” TAAS, vol. 8, no. 4, 2014.
[20] J. W. Holford, W. J. Caelli, and A. W. Rhodes, “Using self-
defending objects to develop security aware applications in
java,” in ACSC, 2004.
